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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court made a ruling that required
Florida to revise its death penalty statute in order to eliminate the possibility
of arbitrary application and to bring it within constitutional limits.' In revis-
ing Florida's death penalty statute, the Florida Legislature devised a trifur-
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Law Center, especially Professor Pearl Goldman, for their support.
I. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
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cated, or "hybrid," type of sentencing scheme? Florida's present sentencing
scheme charges the judge to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circums-
tances present and to reach a determination on which sentence is appropriate,
life imprisonment without parole, or death.3 One of the aggravating circums-
tances enumerated in Florida law is whether "[t]he capital felony was espe-
cially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."4
This article will examine and discuss the evolution of Florida's current
capital sentencing scheme. Particular focus will be given to the statutory
aggravating circumstance of a crime being heinous, atrocious, or cruel,
which, if present, may allow for a possible death sentence.5 This article will
also address the lack of a clear, objective standard to guide both a judge and
a jury in determining when a crime is, or is not, heinous, atrocious or cruel.
It will also explore a combined scientific research initiative called the De-
pravity Scale and its efforts to resolve the absence of a meaningful, objective
standard.
Part II of this article will trace the development of Florida's capital sen-
tencing scheme following the decision in Furman v. Georgia,6 and the ability
of Florida's capital sentencing statute, after Furman, to continually pass con-
stitutional muster. Part mI will examine and discuss various Florida capital
cases, where death sentences have been both affirmed and vacated, to high-
light the varying conceptions of what has been considered heinous, atrocious,
and cruel in Florida courts.
Finally, Part IW will discuss the inception, ideology, and research of the
Depravity Scale, a collaborative scientific effort that aims to provide judges
and juries nationwide with an objective method of defining those crimes that
are heinous, atrocious, and cruel.
II. FLORIDA: BEFORE AND AFTER FURMAN
When the decision in Furman v. Georgia was handed down, the statutes
that were in effect in Florida automatically imposed a death sentence on any
defendant convicted of a capital felony. The only defendants who were
spared the punishment of death were those who received a recommendation
2. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2008).
3. See id.
4. Id. § 921.141(5)(h).
5. Id.
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
7. LaTour Rey Lafferty, Florida's Capital Sentencing Jury Override: Whom Should We
Trust to Make the Ultimate Ethical Judgment?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 468 (1995).
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of mercy from the jury upon return of the verdict.8 In these "recommenda-
tion of mercy" cases, the defendant then received a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment. 9 Thus, the fate of a defendant rested solely with the
jury. 1
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court, in Furman, struck down the
capital punishment statutes of Georgia and Texas." The Court declared the
statutes unconstitutional because their arbitrary application violated the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 12 The majority 3
reasoned that the statutes were applied absent any type of limitation or guid-
ance.' 4 The core of the Furman decision required that the class of defendants
eligible for the death penalty be narrowed, and that a state's capital punish-
ment statute not be administered in a capricious fashion.' 5 It also required
that a state's capital punishment statute achieve this purpose in a manner that
is not arbitrary or discriminatory.16 To align itself with the Furman decision,
the Florida Legislature passed a new death penalty statute which would come
under attack a few years later in Proffitt v. Florida.7
A. Proffitt v. Florida
Following the Furman decision, the United States Supreme Court heard
cases regarding the revised capital sentencing statutes of five states, one of
8. Charles W. Ehrhardt & L. Harold Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Fur-
man: An Exercise in Futility?, 64 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1973); Lafferty, supra note
7, at 468. Moreover, although defendants were automatically allowed appeal to the Supreme
Court of Florida, the issue of sentencing was not permissible for review. Id.
9. Ehrhardt & Levinson, supra note 8, at 10.
10. See id.
I1. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. There were three petitioners in the Furman case, each
of whom received the death penalty. Id. at 239. One petitioner received the death penalty for
murder, and the other two for rape. Id.
12. Lafferty, supra note 7, at 467-68.
13. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. The five Justices included in the majority were Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall. Id. Each of the five Justices in the majority
filed a concurring opinion. Id. Additionally, the dissenting Justices also each wrote a separate
opinion. Id.
14. See generally id.
15. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 249. Addressing the discriminatory aspect of the statutes, Justice Douglas said
"[w]hat the legislature may not do for all classes uniformly and systematically, a judge or jury
may not do for a class that prejudice sets apart from the community." Id.
17. 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976).
20091
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which was Florida. 8 In Proffitt, Florida became one of three states whose
death penalty statute gained approval from the United States Supreme Court
in the wake of Furman.19
Florida's current trifurcated capital punishment statute provides that af-
ter a conviction of a capital offense, a separate trial must be conducted to
determine sentencing. 20 During the sentencing trial, the jury is present and
"the trial judge must permit the introduction of any relevant evidence regard-
ing the nature of the crime and the defendant's character."'2' The jury, after
considering any aggravating and mitigating circumstances, must then provide
an advisory sentencing opinion of either life imprisonment or death to the
trial judge.22 In Florida, the jury's advisory sentence is not required to be
unanimous.
23
Following the receipt of the jury's advisory sentence, the trial judge
must then weigh both the "aggravating and mitigating circumstances," if any,
against each other and make the ultimate decision of whether to impose a
sentence of life imprisonment or death.24 This final sentencing carried out by
the judge, notwithstanding the jury's advisory sentence, is known as the
"jury override."'25 Under Tedder v. State,26 the judge is required to give great
18. Gary Scott Turner, Note, Ring v. Arizona: How Did This Happen, and Where Do We
Go?, 27 NOVA. L. REV. 501, 508 (2003). The other four states were North Carolina, Louisi-
ana, Georgia, and Texas. Id.
19. Id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (2008). Florida law provides that "[u]pon conviction or
adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sen-
tencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment." Id.
21. Lafferty, supra note 7, at 468.
22. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2).
23. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 716 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (Shaw, J., concur-
ring). "In these proceedings it is not necessary that the advisory sentence of the jury be un-
animous." Id.
24. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3). The Supreme Court of Florida has said that:
It must be emphasized that the procedure to be followed by the trial judges and juries is
not a mere counting process of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of miti-
gating circumstances, but rather a reasoned judgment as to what factual situations require the
imposition of death and which can be satisfied by life imprisonment in light of the totality of
the circumstances present.
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973).
25. Id. at 15.
26. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975) (per curiam). In Tedder, the defendant, Mack Reed Ted-
der, was convicted of first-degree murder. Id. at 909. At the sentencing hearing, the judge
found three aggravating, and no mitigating, circumstances present. Id. at 910. One of the
three aggravators found was "that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Id.
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weight to the advisory opinion of the jury.27 However, if a jury does advise a
sentence of life imprisonment and the trial judge imposes a death sentence,
the judge is then required to provide, in writing, specific findings of fact re-
levant to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. If a death sentence
is imposed, under Florida law, it is automatically reviewed by the Supreme
Court of Florida.29 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Florida will also
conduct a "proportionality review," even if the issue of proportionality is not
raised on appeal.3"
In Proffitt, the defendant, Charles William Proffitt, was convicted of
first-degree murder.3' Following his conviction, as required by Florida sta-
tute, a separate sentencing "hearing was held to determine whether [Proffitt]
should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. '32 Under Florida's
newly enacted sentencing scheme, whether Proffitt was sentenced to life
imprisonment or death hinged on whether the aggravating circumstances
present outweighed the mitigating circumstances present.33 Following the
sentencing hearing, the jury rendered its advisory opinion recommending
that Proffitt receive the death penalty. 34 Then, as provided for in the Florida
statute, the judge independently weighed the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances present.3' The judge found four aggravating circumstances, and
no mitigating circumstances were present.36 The judge then sentenced Prof-
fitt to death.37 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Proffitt' s sentence
was affirmed.3t
27. Id. (holding "[a] jury recommendation under [Florida's] trifurcated death penalty
statute should be given great weight"). This is commonly referred to as the "Tedder stan-
dard." Lafferty, supra note 7, at 470.
28. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2007). An important ruling on the issue of jury over-
ride presented itself in Tedder. See Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 909-11. Here, the Supreme Court
of Florida held that in order for a death sentence to be upheld "following a jury recommenda-
tion of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that
virtually no reasonable person could differ." Id. at 910.
29. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4). The "sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review
by the Supreme Court of Florida... within 2 years after the filing of a notice of appeal. Such
review.., shall have priority over all other cases." Id.
30. England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 407 (Fla. 2006) (citing Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d
1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam)).
31. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 244-45 (1976).
32. Id. at 245-46.
33. Id. at 246.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 246-27.
36. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 246-47. One of four aggravating circumstances found by the
judge was that "the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel." Id. at 246.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 247.
2009]
5
Barton: Knowing Evil When We See It: An Attempt to Standardize Heinous, A
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAWREVIEW
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether Florida's recently enacted sentencing scheme was in violation of
Proffitt's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 39 The Court
upheld Florida's statute as constitutional. 40 The Court reasoned that sentenc-
ing determined by a judge and not a jury was an adequate measure to insure
that the death penalty was not applied "in an arbitrary or capricious man-
ner."4' This was because "a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing
than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose sentences similar to those
imposed in analogous cases. 42 As another constitutional challenge, Proffitt
argued that the aggravating circumstance of a crime being especially hein-
ous, atrocious, or cruel was overly vague.43 The Court denied Proffitt's ar-
gument, holding that this aggravating circumstance was sufficiently narrow,
as defined by the Supreme Court of Florida. 4
B. Walton v. Arizona
Another significant decision of the United States Supreme Court, re-
garding a capital sentencing statute similar to that of Florida's, came in Wal-
ton v. Arizona.45 In Walton, the defendant, Jeffrey Walton, along with two
others, robbed the victim, Thomas Powell, at gunpoint.46 Then, Walton and
his two accomplices drove Powell out to the desert.47 Walton exited the ve-
hicle with Powell, walked him out into the desert, forced him to lie on the
ground, and with his foot on Powell's neck, shot Powell in the head. 48
Walton was tried and convicted of first-degree murder.49 Following the
trial, and without the jury in attendance, the judge then conducted a separate
hearing on the issue of sentencing.50 During sentencing, the judge found that
39. Id.
40. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60.
41. Id. at 252-53.
42. Id. at 252.
43. Id. at 255.
44. Id. at 255-56. This "definition," provided by the Supreme Court of Florida, consisted
of statements that "'the Legislature intended something "especially" heinous, atrocious or
cruel when it authorized the death penalty for first degree murder"' and that the aggravator of
heinous, atrocious, or cruel only applied to "'the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is
unnecessarily torturous to the victim."' Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283
So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973)); see also Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
45. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
46. Id. at 644.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 645.
50. Walton, 497 U.S. at 645.
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there were two aggravating circumstances present.5' One of the two aggra-
vating circumstances found was that the crime was "'especially heinous,
cruel or depraved.' 51 The judge, finding no mitigating circumstances, then
imposed the death penalty as Walton's sentence. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Arizona, Walton's sentence of death was affirmed.54
Following receiving his sentence of death, Walton was granted certiora-
ri by the United States Supreme Court and argued that the aggravating cir-
cumstances being decided by a judge and not a jury directly violated his
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.55 In rejecting Walton's constitu-
tional argument and upholding the Arizona statute, the United States Su-
preme Court relied heavily on its decisions in previous challenges to Flori-
da's death penalty statute. 56 The Court reiterated that "'the Sixth Amend-
ment does not require [a jury to make] specific findings authorizing the im-
position of the sentence of death."
57
In its opinion, the Court reasoned that because aggravating circums-
tances are "not elements of the crime," but merely considerations for sen-
tencing, Arizona's statute was not unconstitutional for allowing only the
judge to decide the aggravating circumstances. 58 The Court decided that
these aggravating circumstances were considerations, rather than elements,
because "the judge's findings did not result in a conviction or acquittal. 59
Thus, the Arizona capital sentencing statute was upheld.6°
51. Id.
52. Id. This aggravating circumstance was partially attributable to the testimony given
by a medical examiner "that Powell had been blinded and rendered unconscious by the shot
but was not immediately killed. Instead, Powell regained consciousness, apparently floun-
dered about in the desert, and ultimately died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia
approximately a day before his body was found." See id. at 644-45.
53. Id. at 645.
54. Walton, 497 U.S. at 645. The Supreme Court of Arizona also upheld the finding of
the "heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating factor. Id. at 646. It relied on its previous deci-
sions stating that an aggravating circumstance is present when a victim experiences "'mental
anguish or physical abuse"' before his or her death. Id. The Supreme Court of Arizona found
as evidence of Thomas Powell's anguish the fact that he was walked out into the desert by
Walton at gunpoint, and, as a result of his anguish, urinated on himself. Id. at 646 n.3.
55. Id. at 647.
56. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-48; see also Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41
(1989) (per curiam) (upholding Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), ruling that Florida's
capital punishment statute was constitutional because under the Sixth Amendment, a jury is
not required to make the findings necessary to impose the death sentence).
57. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640-41).
58. Turner, supra note 18, at 514-15.
59. Id. at515.
60. Walton, 497 U.S. at 649.
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C. Ring v. Arizona
However, in 2002, the role that aggravating factors played in the impo-
sition of the death penalty again came before the United States Supreme
Court in Ring v. Arizona.6' In Ring, the defendant, Timothy Stuart Ring, was
convicted of felony murder in the first degree.62 Following the trial, but prior
to the sentencing hearing, testimony of one of the defendant's accomplices to
the crime was heard by the judge.63 Based on this testimony, the judge drew
the conclusion that the defendant was the one, of all involved, who actually
shot the victim.' The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of
which was that the crime was carried out "'in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner.' "65 Under the jury's verdict, Ring was only subject to a
sentence of life imprisonment. 66 However, the finding of the two aggravat-
ing factors by the judge provided for a sentence of death. 67 Ring was sen-
tenced to death, and his sentence was affirmed following his appeal to the
Supreme Court of Arizona.68
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Ring challenged Arizo-
na's death penalty statute, arguing that allowing a judge, and not a jury, to
make the finding of an aggravating factor was in violation of his rights under
the Sixth Amendment.69 The Court agreed, and reversed Ring's sentence of
death.70 The Court reasoned that if a state could enhance a defendant's sen-
tence based on a finding of fact in order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, that
finding of fact must be made by a jury, and not a judge.7'
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court of Florida has been pre-
sented with claims that Florida's death penalty statute is unconstitutional
under the Ring decision. 72 Two particularly noteworthy cases where the Su-
61. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
62. Turner, supra note 18, at 519.
63. Id. at 519-20. The accomplice's testimony implicated Ring as the one, of all in-
volved, that shot the victim. Id. at 520.
64. Id.
65. id. (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 594-95).
66. Turner, supra note 18, at 521.
67. Id.
68. Benjamin F. Diamond, Note, The Sixth Amendment: Where Did the Jury Go? Flori-
da's Flawed Sentencing in Death Penalty Cases, 55 FLA. L. REV. 905, 917 (2003). When
Ring was decided, in addition to Arizona, it also made the death penalty statutes of Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska unconstitutional. Turner, supra note 18, at 523.
69. ld. at 521.
70. Diamond, supra note 68, at 917-18.
71. Id. at 918.
72. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 865 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); Smith v. State,
866 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2004) (per cu-
[Vol. 33
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preme Court of Florida addressed this issue were Bottoson v. Moore73 and
King v. Moore.74 Both Bottoson and King, in different cases, were convicted
of murder and received the death penalty.75 Following their sentencing, both
Bottoson and King received a stay of execution from the United States Su-
preme Court.76 After each was granted a stay of execution, the Supreme
Court of Florida decided Ring.77 After the Ring decision was made, both
Bottoson and King had their certiorari denied by the Court.78
In Florida, the jury is responsible for considering aggravating circums-
tances in rendering its advisory opinion and the judge is charged with deter-
mining which, if any, aggravating circumstances are present in imposing a
sentence.79 Only aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute may
be considered. 0 One aggravating circumstance under Florida law is whether
riam); Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Davis v. State, 875 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Zakr-
zewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d 687 (Fla.
2003) (per curiam); Cummings-El v. State, 863 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Jones v.
State, 855 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Davis v. State, 859 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 2003) (per
curiam); Rivera v. State, 859 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Stewart v. State, 872 So. 2d
226 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); McCoy v. State, 853 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Owen
v. Crosby, 854 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255 (Fla.
2003) (per curiam); Belcher v. State, 851 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Caballero v.
State, 851 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650 (Fla.
2003) (per curiam); Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Harris v. State,
843 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Banks v. State, 842 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2003) (per cu-
riam); Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Lawrence v. State, 846 So. 2d
440 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Jones v.
State, 845 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2003)
(per curiam); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Anderson v. State,
841 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Cole v. State, 841 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2003) (per cu-
riam); Conahan v. State, 844 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d
52 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Lynch
v. State, 841 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam); Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2003)
(per curiam); Fotopoulos v. State, 838 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Israel v. State,
837 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Bruno v. Moore, 838 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2002) (per
curiam); Marquard v. State, 850 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Chavez v. State, 832 So.
2d 730 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Washington v. State, 835 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2002) (per cu-
riam); Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); King v. Moore, 831 So.
2d 143 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
73. 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
74. 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
75. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 694; King, 831 So. 2d at 144.
76. Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 697 (Wells, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 695 (majority opinion).
78. Id. at 697 (Wells, J., concurring).
79. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2)-(3) (2008).
80. Id. § 921.141(5). Florida's statutory aggravating circumstances are as follows:
2009]
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"[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' However,
no standardized definition of what heinous, atrocious, or cruel actually
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment
or placed on community control or on probation.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after commit-
ting or attempting to commit, any: robbery; sexual battery; aggravated child abuse;
abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult resulting in great bodily harm, perma-
nent disability, or permanent disfigurement; arson; burglary; kidnapping; aircraft
piracy; or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or
bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.
() The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the
performance of his or her official duties.
(k) The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public official en-
gaged in the performance of his or her official duties if the motive for the capital fe-
lony was related, in whole or in part, to the victim's official capacity.
(I) The victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12 years of age.
(in) The victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced
age or disability, or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodi-
al authority over the victim.
(n) The capital felony was committed by a criminal street gang member ....
(o) The capital felony was committed by a person designated as a sexual predator..
. or a person previously designated as a sexual predator who had the sexual predator
designation removed.
Id. § 921.141(5)(a)-(o).
81. Id. § 921.141(5)(h).
10
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means for sentencing purposes is currently in existence. 2 This creates a
conundrum because Florida is one of thirty-nine states that allow for either
the death penalty or a more severe sentencing when a crime is heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel.83
Florida began implementing the use of aggravating circumstances to
",narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." '84 However, the
United States Supreme Court also requires that these aggravating circums-
tances provide "'clear and objective standards' that [afford] 'specific and
detailed guidance.'
a8 5
Evidence of the vagueness that surrounds determining if a crime is
heinous, atrocious, or cruel can be found in the Supreme Court of Florida
opinion, State v. Dixon.86 Directly addressing the heinous, atrocious, and
cruel factor, Justice Adkins, writing for the majority, said:
The aggravating circumstance which has been most frequently
attacked is the provision that commission of an especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel capital felony constitutes an aggravated capital
felony. Again, we feel that the meaning of such terms is a matter
of common knowledge, so that an ordinary man would not have to
guess at what was intended. It is our interpretation that heinous
means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means
outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed to
inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even en-
joyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be in-
cluded are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the
capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set
the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies-the conscience-
less or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the vic-
tim.87
Again, if a judge determines that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, the judge can override the jury's advisory sen-
82. See Michael Weiner, Response to Simon: Legal Relevance Demands That Evil Be
Defined and Standardized, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 417, 417 (2003) [hereinafter
Weiner, Response to Simon].
83. Id.
84. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 232 (1988) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 877 (1983)).
85. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 428 (1980)).
86. 283 So. 2d 1, 18 (Fla. 1973), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. § 782.04(3), as rec-
ognized in State v. Dane, 533 So. 2d 265, 268-69 (Fla. 1988).
87. Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
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tence.88 The constitutionality of Florida's statutory provision allowing the
trial judge, and not the jury, to make the final sentencing determination was
challenged in Spaziano v. Florida.89 In 1976, Spaziano was convicted of first
degree murder.9° The majority vote of the jury was for a sentence of life
imprisonment.9 ' Notwithstanding the jury's recommendation of life impri-
sonment, the trial court judge found there were sufficient aggravating cir-
cumstances present to warrant a death sentence.92 Two aggravating factors
were found, one of which was that the crime "was especially heinous and
atrocious." 93 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Spaziano's sen-
tence of death was reversed due to an error in sentencing.94 On remand, the
trial judge once again found the murder was heinous, atrocious, and cruel
and, for the second time, sentenced Spaziano to death. 95 Once again, Spazia-
no appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida, and this time, Spaziano's sen-
tence was affirmed.96
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Spaziano argued that
Florida's override provision violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.97 The issue presented to the Court was, "whether, given a jury
verdict of life," a trial judge may override the jury and impose a sentence of
death.98 The United States Supreme Court decided a judge could in fact
88. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2007).
89. 468 U.S. 447, 449 (1984).
90. Id. at 451.
91. id.
92. Id. at 451-52.
93. Id. at 452.
94. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 452. The sentencing error was caused when the trial judge did
not allow Spaziano an opportunity to respond after the judge received a presentence report
containing confidential information, and relied on it. See Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119,
1122 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
95. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 453. For a similar scenario, see generally Orme v. State, 677
So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam). In Orme, the defendant, Roderick Michael Orme, after
freebasing cocaine, called the victim, a nurse he had known for some time, for assistance
during a "bad high." Id. at 260. Upon her arrival to the hotel where Orme was staying, Orme
raped, beat, and strangled her. 1d. Orme was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death. Id.
at 261. The judge found that three aggravating factors were present. Id. One of the three
aggravating factors found was that the crime was heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Orme, 677
So. 2d at 261.
96. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 453; see also Spaziano v. State, 433 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla.
1983) (holding as constitutional the Florida provision allowing a judge to override the advi-
sory opinion of a jury).
97. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 457-58.
98. Id. at 458. When Spaziano was decided, the only other states which allowed a jury
override were Alabama and Indiana. Lafferty, supra note 7, at 472.
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override a jury's advisory opinion.99 The Court held that the Florida re-
quirements in place allowing for a judge to override the advisory opinion of a
jury for sentencing were not so broad or vague as to make them unconstitu-
tional.' °° Additionally, the Court rejected Spaziano's Sixth Amendment ar-
gument, holding that the Sixth Amendment does not "guarantee a right to a
jury determination" on the issue of punishment.'O°
]]. CASE STUDIES: RECONCILING HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, AND CRUEL IN
FLORIDA
Various Florida cases can be examined to show the varying conceptions
of what has been considered heinous, atrocious, and cruel. This is of impor-
tance because, as stated by the Supreme Court of Florida, the heinous, atro-
cious, and cruel aggravator is one "of the most weighty in Florida's sentenc-
ing calculus.10 2 However, Florida currently has no method in place to pre-
cisely define these terms. 0 3 The confusion that surrounds what crimes quali-
fy as heinous, atrocious, or cruel was summed up succinctly by Judge Bar-
kett when she stated that:
[M]any death-penalty states require consideration of whether a
murder was committed in an "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" manner. But what does this mean? Must the perpetrator
have intended to torture his victim? Must the victim have suffered
even though suffering was not intended by the perpetrator? This
factor has been applied so broadly that it has led to anomalous re-
sults. 04
99. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 454.
100. Id. at 449. However, Justice Stevens opined that Florida's capital sentencing statute
was "unusual" because "[i]t consists of a determination of guilt or innocence by the jury, an
advisory sentence by the jury, and an actual sentence imposed by the trial judge." Id. at 470
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Id. at 459.
102. Sireci v. Moore, 825 So. 2d 882, 887 (Fla. 2002).
103. See Welner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 417. The United States Supreme
Court has said that "[a] State's definitions of its aggravating circumstances-those circums-
tances that make a criminal defendant 'eligible' for the death penalty-therefore play a signif-
icant role in channeling the sentencer's discretion." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774
(1990).
104. Rosemary Barkett, Judicial Discretion and Judicious Deliberation, 59 FLA. L. REV.
905,927-28 (2007).
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The numerous cases below will attempt to illuminate the lack of un-
iformity in Florida courts in defining exactly what constitutes a crime being
heinous, atrocious, and cruel.
A. We Know Evil: Upholding the Presence of Heinous, Atrocious, and
Cruel
1. Johnson v. State
In Johnson v. State,'0 5 the defendant, Richard Allen Johnson, was con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death." In 2001, Johnson met his victim
at a bar.0 7 Johnson and his victim then spent the night together, and the fol-
lowing day, the two had an argument.'0 8 Johnson then killed his victim by
strangling her both manually with his hands, and also with a ligature.' °9
In determination of his death sentence, one of the aggravating circums-
tances found by the judge was that the murder was carried out in a heinous,
atrocious, or cruel manner."0  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida
upheld the finding of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator and affirmed
Johnson's sentence."'
2. Butler v. State
Another example of a crime being deemed heinous, atrocious, or cruel
is found in Butler v. State. 12 Here, the defendant, Harry Butler, entered the
home of his ex-girlfriend, Leslie Fleming, the victim. 1 3 Butler and Fleming
had a daughter together who was in the bedroom with Fleming at the time
Butler entered the home. 14 Butler then picked his daughter up and took her
into a separate bedroom.' '5
105. 969 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
106. Id. at 943.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 944. Additionally, testimony was given at trial that Johnson stated it took long-
er to break the victim's neck than he thought it would. Johnson, 969 So. 2d at 944.
110. Id. at 945.
Ill. Id. at 962.
112. 842 So. 2d 817, 833 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam).
113. Id. at 821.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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After putting his daughter in another room, Butler then went back into
the room where Fleming was." 6 Butler then both stabbed Fleming multiple
times and then strangled her.1 " Butler was convicted of first-degree mur-
der." 8 The jury rendered an advisory sentence by a vote of eleven to one that
Butler receive the death penalty."1 9 During the sentencing trial, the trial
judge found only one aggravating circumstance present, that the murder was
heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 2 ' Several mitigating circumstances were also
found. 2 ' Butler was sentenced to death.
22
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Butler's death sentence, and
the finding of the aggravator, was upheld. 23 The court held that a sentence
of death, even when the only aggravating circumstance found is that the
murder is heinous, atrocious, or cruel, is not disproportionate, even if there
are several mitigating circumstances present. 24
3. Coday v. State
Once again, in Coday v. State, 25 the aggravator of heinous, atrocious,
and cruel was found. 126 In this case, the defendant, William Coday, was con-
victed for the murder of his former girlfriend, Gloria Gomez, and sentenced
to death. 27 Coday and Gomez had an on again, off again relationship.
2 8
After breaking up, Coday lured Gomez to his apartment by lying and telling
Gomez he had cancer. 29 When Gomez arrived, Coday attempted to recon-
cile their relationship. 130 When Gomez refused his advances, Coday "flew
into a rage and punched" Gomez.1
31
Coday then began to strike Gomez with a hammer. 32 During the com-
mission of the attack, Coday struck Gomez with a hammer a total of fifty-
116. Id.
117. Butler, 842 So. 2d at 821.
118. Id. at 820-21.
119. Id. at 822.
120. Id. at 833.
121. Id.
122. Butler, 842 So. 2d at 833.
123. Id. at 834.
124. Id. at 833.
125. 946 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
126. Id. at 1006.
127. Id. at 992.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Coday, 946 So. 2d at 992.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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seven times. 33 Following the strikes of the hammer, Coday then stabbed
Gomez with a knife eighty-seven times.'" Then, while Gomez was likely
still conscious, Coday stabbed Gomez in the throat, and held the knife there
until she died. 35 At trial, expert medical testimony was presented that the
victim was likely alive the entire time. 36 Due to the nature of the attack, the
trial court gave great weight to the aggravating circumstance of the crime
being heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
37
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Coday argued that the find-
ing of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator was improper because "he
did not have an intentional design to torture or inflict pain.' 38  The court
rejected this argument, and upheld Coday's conviction and vacated the sen-
tence, affirming the finding of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator
because Coday's action represented "utter indifference to the suffering of'
the victim.'
39
B. Mistaking Evil: Some Crimes Do Not Rise to the Level of Heinous
1. Robertson v. State
Conversely, cases can be found where the aggravator of heinous, atro-
cious, and cruel was found, and death sentences imposed, only to have them
later vacated on appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida. 40 In Robertson v.
State,'4' the defendant, Lavarity Robertson, was convicted of two counts of
133. Id. at 1006.
134. Id.
135. Coday, 946 So. 2d at 1006.
136. Id. In addition to the medical testimony that the victim, Gloria Gomez, was likely
still alive, Coday signed a written confession to the effect that "Gomez was alive until the fatal
stab wound when he thrust the knife into her neck and held it there until she expired." Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Coday, 946 So. 2d at 1006. In upholding the finding of the heinous, atrocious, or
cruel aggravator, the court said:
In this case, Coday brutally beat Gloria Gomez with two hammers a total of fifty-seven times.
He then stabbed her eighty-seven times. The medical examiner testified that Gomez was alive
for 143 of the 144 wounds, that she was conscious for all of her defensive wounds, and that she
may have been conscious for 143 of the wounds. In Coday's signed, written confession, he
wrote that Gomez was alive until the fatal stab wound when he thrust the knife into her neck
and held it there until she expired. The facts demonstrate at the very least an utter indifference
to the suffering of Gloria Gomez.
Id.
140. See, e.g., Robertson v. State, 611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam); Bonifay v.
State, 626 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam); McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla.
1991).
141. 611 So. 2d at 1228.
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murder and sentenced to death. 42 In 1988, Robertson came upon a couple
sitting in a parked car.143 Deciding to rob the couple, Robertson approached
the driver's side of the vehicle. 44 After demanding money, he shot the first
victim.1 45 The second victim then exited the vehicle screaming, and Robert-
son shot her as well.
46
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed Robertson's death
sentence, finding the aggravator of heinous, atrocious, or cruel was not
present because the murder was not committed with the intent of torturing
the victim or "the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or with the enjoy-
ment of' the victim's suffering. 147 The court went on to say that the heinous,
atrocious, or cruel aggravator is only found in murders that include torture or
murders where depravity, shown by the desire to cause a high degree of suf-
fering, is present.148 Because the murders committed by Robertson were
ordinary shootings, they were not outside the "norm" and as such, not hein-
ous, atrocious, or cruel.
14 9
2. Bonifay v. State
In Bonifay v. State,50 the defendant, James Patrick Bonifay, killed a
clerk who worked at a parts store where his cousin was previously fired
from.' 5' Bonifay and an accomplice each shot the victim once. 5 2 After
shooting the victim, Bonifay and his accomplice then broke open cash boxes
located in the store. 53 In the midst of Bonifay and his accomplice emptying
the cash boxes, the victim, who was still conscious, begged for his life.
54
The victim also told Bonifay that he had a wife and children. 55 Bonifay told
the victim to "shut up" and then proceeded to fire two bullets into the vic-
142. Id. at 1231-32.
143. Id. at 1230.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Robertson, 611 So. 2d at 1230.
147. Id. at 1233.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 626 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam).
151. Id. at 1311. The apparent motive for the killing was the belief of Bonifay's cousin
that the clerk was the cause of him being released from his employment. Id. However, the
record shows that the intended victim was not working on the night of the murder, and another
clerk was killed. Id.
152. Id.
153. Bonifay, 626 So. 2d at 1311.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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tim's head. 156 Bonifay was subsequently convicted of murder, and during the
sentencing phase, the judge found four aggravators present, and sentenced
Bonifay to death. 157 One of the aggravators found was that the murder was
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' 58
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida found that there was no evi-
dence to support the aggravator of heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 159 Although
the victim begged for his life, the court held that there was no intent "to in-
flict a high degree of pain or to otherwise torture the victim."' 60 The court
went on to explain that a victim begging for his or her life, or the presence of
multiple gunshots, was not an adequate basis to find the aggravator of hein-
ous, atrocious, or cruel, unless "Bonifay intended to cause the victim unne-
cessary and prolonged suffering.' 6 ' Following this finding, Bonifay's death
sentence was vacated and his case remanded for a new sentencing process. 62
3. McKinney v. State
In McKinney v. State, 63 the defendant, Boris McKinney, was convicted
of murder and other charges. 64 In 1987, McKinney robbed the victim and
then drove him to an overpass where he then shot the victim. 65 McKinney
then brought the victim to an alley, where he eventually disposed of the
body, and shot the victim two more times. 66 Following the trial, the court
found that there were three aggravators present. 67 One of the three aggrava-
tors was that the murder was "unnecessarily heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' 68
At sentencing, McKinney received the death penalty.' 69
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1311-12.
158. Bonifay, 626 So. 2d at 1312.
159. Id. at 1313.
160. Id.
161. id. However, even if a victim is interrogated before being shot execution style, this
still will not satisfy the requirement of being heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See Maharaj v.
State, 597 So. 2d 786, 791 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam).
162. Bonifay, 626 So. 2d at 1311-12.
163. 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991).
164. Id. at 81. The other charges McKinney was convicted of included "unlawful display
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, armed robbery, armed kidnapping, armed
burglary of a conveyance, and grand theft of an automobile." Id. at 82.
165. Id. at 84.
166. Id.
167. McKinney, 579 So. 2d at 82.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, McKinney argued that the
aggravator of heinous, atrocious, or cruel did not apply to his case.17 ° The
Supreme Court of Florida agreed. 17' The court held that the aggravator of
heinous, atrocious, or cruel was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
72
The court expressed that "[w]hile it is true that the victim was shot multiple
times, a murder is not heinous, atrocious, or cruel without additional facts to
raise the shooting to the shocking level required by this factor.' ' 173 Because
there were no additional facts, aside from the victim being shot multiple
times, the court held that the aggravator of heinous, atrocious, or cruel was
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.174 Thus, the Supreme Court of Flori-
da subsequently vacated McKinney's death sentence.
175
IV. THE DEPRAVITY SCALE: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO DEFINING
EVIL
The Depravity Scale is being developed by the Forensic Panel, 76 which
is "the only peer-reviewed forensic consultation practice [located] in the
United States.' 7 7 In the United States, many states allow for harsher sen-
tencing and in some cases the death penalty for crimes that are found to be
"depraved," "heinous," or "evil.' 78 However, these terms are ambiguous,
and as such, "these aggravating factors have offered judges and juries little in
terms of guidance.' ' 79 As previously mentioned, in Florida, one of the enu-
merated aggravating factors of a crime is especially heinous, atrocious, or
170. Id. at 84.
171. Id.
172. McKinney, 579 So. 2d at 84.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 85.
176. The Forensic Panel is a peer reviewed forensic practice, founded by Michael Weiner,
M.D., whose members specialize in the fields of psychiatry, psychology, toxicology and neu-
ropsychology, and provide consultation services on court cases. Michael Weiner, The De-
pravity Scale, Forensic Panel, About Us. http://www.forensicpanel.com/aboutus/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Weiner, About Us]. All research conducted for the
Depravity Scale is solely funded by the Forensic Panel. Michael Weiner, The Depravity
Scale, Forensic Panel, FAQ, https:/depravityscale.org/depscale/faq.php (last visited Apr. 5,
2009) [hereinafter Weiner, FAQ].
177. Michael Weiner, Symposium: Hidden Diagnosis and Misleading Testimony: How
Courts Get Shortchanged, 24 PACE L. REV. 193, 193 (2003). Michael Weiner is the Chairman
of The Forensic Panel, a Clinical Associate Professor of Psychiatry at New York University
School of Medicine and also serves as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Duquesne University
School of Law. Id.
178. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
179. Barkett, supra note 104, at 927.
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cruel.' 80 Although there is no statutory definition of what these terms mean,
the Supreme Court of Florida has said:
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and
vile; and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain
with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of
others. What is intended to be included are those capital crimes
where the actual commission of the capital felony was accompa-
nied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm
of capital felonies-the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is
unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
181
Again, no objective method exists that assesses whether a crime meets
these criteria, or defines just what these words mean. By creating the De-
pravity Scale, the Forensic Panel seeks to undertake the task of scientifically
guiding jurors and judges in determining whether a crime qualifies as hein-
ous or depraved, in an effort to eliminate leaving these determinations up to
subjective personal opinion. 82 "In a system sensitive, at sentencing, to pre-
judice influenced by race, orientation, and socioeconomic factors, mingling
the 'what' of a crime with other factors that had nothing to do with the perpe-
trator's intent, actions, and attitudes undercuts an unbiased, equal justice." '183
"Is it fair for one person to characterize anyone [as] evil without an ob-
jective standardized appraisal of his intent, actions, and attitudes?"'184 Al-
though many people can recognize certain crimes are worse than others, the
Depravity Scale seeks out how to objectively and fairly determine the worst
of the worst. 185 "Standardized definitions must integrate the diversity of our
social, psychological, and cultural influences on our perception of what dis-
tinguishes certain acts for additional accountability-for all criminal cases,
not merely murder."'186 Without clear guidelines, it is not far-reaching to
assume that both judges and juries can have their judgment colored by emo-
tion when deciding whether a particular crime is heinous or depraved. 87
This is why the Depravity Scale enlists input given by the public to allow the
180. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (2007).
181. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973).
182. Welner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 418-19.
183. Id. at417-18.
184. Id. at 420.
185. Welner, FAQ, supra note 176.
186. Welner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 418.
187. See Paul H.B. Shin, Depravity Scale: Weighing the Evil That Men Do, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, May 14, 2006, at 20.
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public "to affect criminal sentencing standards."'' 8 8 An individual, regardless
of his or her familiarity or experience in the legal or forensic science fields,
can participate in Phases B and C of the Scale's research initiative. 18
9
The Depravity Scale focuses on the "what" of the crime, and not the
"who."' 90 The founder of the Forensic Panel, Michael Weiner, feels it neces-
sary for jurors, when deciding whether the aggravating circumstance of hein-
ousness or depravity is present, to be provided with an objective guide to
shield them from deciding based on trial tactics and possible bias.' 91 The
Depravity Scale seeks to distinguish between the worst of crimes in a stan-
dardized and consistent manner. 192 It also aims to change the way the law
enforcement community investigates crimes. 193 The Depravity Scale is a
chart comprised of objective categories of an offender's traits and crime,
such as intent, the act itself, and behavior.' 94 The goal of the Depravity Scale
is to "yield a standardized instrument that focuses inexperienced juries on
evidence."' 195 This is necessary because in order to justify a harsher sentence,
such as death, the fact pattern of a heinous, atrocious, or cruel crime must be
distinguishable from a crime that is not.
196
A. Researching the Evil Side of Crime
The research of the Depravity Scale is broken in to three separate phas-
es: A, B, and C. 197 The research that sparked the Depravity Scale began in
1998.198 In Phase A, the Depravity Scale's founder, Michael Weiner, studied
over one-hundred appellate court decisions, randomly selected, "where jury
188. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Amanda Phillips, Psychology 101: The Mind of a Shooter, 34 L. ENFORCE. TECH. 38,
45 (2007).
193. Id. at 46.
194. Neely Tucker, Giving Evil the Eye; Juries Don't Always Know Heinous Crimes When
They See Them, but This Might Help, WASH. POST, July 23, 2007, at CI.
195. Weiner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 420.
196. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
197. Id.
198. Id. The research conducted by the Depravity Scale is overseen by an advisory board.
Id. The advisory board consists of professionals and experts in fields such as psychology,
criminology, forensic nursing, law, computer science, law enforcement, pathology, entomolo-
gy, history, and engineering. Id.
2009]
21
Barton: Knowing Evil When We See It: An Attempt to Standardize Heinous, A
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
findings of 'heinous' or 'depraved' were challenged and upheld."' 99 The
details of the crime in each case were then organized by common features.2"
Next, these features were organized and termed in accordance with
psychiatric diagnostic constructs typically associated with excep-
tionally notorious behavior: specifically, antisocial personality,
psychopathy, malignant narcissism, antisocial-by-proxy, sadism,
and necrophilia. Fifteen items emerged from this exercise of as-
certaining "depraved" intents, actions, and attitudes as had been
signified by American courts, establishing content validity.
20 1
The Depravity Scale is currently in Phase B of its research effort which
consists of releasing a survey to the public. 2 2 Participants are given scena-
rios and asked to rate whether a crime is "'especially,' 'somewhat,' or 'not'
depraved.' 20 3  The participant is provided with twenty-six categories of
crimes. 2°4 The high percentage of people in agreement, approximately
25,000 people who have taken the survey, is surprising. 2 5 Results of the
survey show that ninety-nine percent of all those responding "agree that 'ac-
tions that cause grotesque suffering,' 'intent to emotionally traumatize' and
'actions that prolong suffering,' are depraved. '206 Furthermore, the research
effort of the Depravity Scale recognizes that a number of variables may in-
fluence one's opinion of what is heinous or depraved.20 7 To combat res-
ponses being too heavily influenced by a respondent's demographics, the
199. Weiner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 419.
200. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
201. id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. Some of the categories include: emotionally traumatizing someone, maximizing
damage and destruction, causing disfigurement, targeting victims who are vulnerable, reacting
to a trivial irritant, prolonging the suffering of a victim and inflicting exceptional harm physi-
cally. Posting of Marie Price to Depravity Scale Blog, https://depravityscale.org/blog/?m=
200612 (Dec. 20, 2006, 16:37 EST). Additionally, the crime scenarios are given range from
non-violent, such as property crimes, to violent. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176. This is so all
criminal acts, not just murder alone, are included because "[s]tandardized definitions must
distinguish certain acts for greater accountability." Id.
205. Tucker, supra note 194. Those who completed the survey are representative of more
than fifty countries, with the highest number of respondents being located within the United
States. Id.
206. Id.
207. Weiner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 419.
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Depravity Scale has implemented control factors in its conduction of re-
search.208
Following Phase B, Phase C shall "establish how the items on the final
[scale] should be 'weighted' upon measuring the factors present in a given
crime. 2 °9 Phase C evaluates the items under research to compare them to
one another.21 ° In order to partially determine an item's "weight," survey
"[p]articipants are asked to rank the items from 'least depraved' . . . to 'most
depraved' . . . when presented together in randomly ordered subgroups. 211
Each survey participant is provided with a random set of unique questions, to
determine "whether participants consistently regard certain items as more
depraved than other items, regardless of presentation order or reference
frame., 2
12
V. CONCLUSION
Florida's trifurcated capital sentencing scheme requires the jury to con-
sider aggravating factors when rendering its advisory sentence of life impri-
sonment or death. a 3 The sentencing scheme also charges the judge to weigh
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in a crime in reaching a
conclusion on which sentence is appropriate, life imprisonment without pa-
role or death.214 One of the fifteen enumerated aggravating circumstances in
Florida is whether "[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel. 215 Although the Supreme Court of Florida has said "we feel that the
meaning of such terms is a matter of common knowledge, so that an ordinary
man would not have to guess at what was intended, 216 currently no objective
method exists to define these "common knowledge" terms.21 7
208. Id. The variables for which controls are in place include age, gender, ethnicity, histo-
ry of victimization, state of residence, profession, attitude toward the death penalty, level of
spirituality, education level, location, degree of religious tradition and others. Id. at tbl. I. No
one has "distinguished the social, political, religious, and cultural influences on peoples' per-
ceptions of depravity. Therefore ... to establish intents, actions, and attitudes [the] research
must take into account all potentially confounding variables." Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. Additionally, each participant is only able to partake in the surveys that comprise
Phase B and Phase C one time each. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
213. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(a) (2008).
214. Id. § 921.141(3).
215. Id. § 921.141(5)(h).
216. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973).
217. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
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Because the presence of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator can
mean life or death, judges and juries should have some standard of deciding
objectively which crimes are the worst of the worst.218 To truly bring this
aggravating circumstance into the category of "clear and objective" required
by the United States Supreme Court, 19 courts need some method of defining
just what these terms are to mean.
This is exactly what the Depravity Scale seeks to do by scientifically
guiding jurors and judges in determining whether a crime qualifies as hein-
ous or depraved in an effort to eliminate leaving these determinations up to
subjective personal opinion. "Without standardized direction, jury decisions
on whether a crime is depraved are all too often contaminated by details
about the 'who' of a crime ... as opposed to focusing on 'what' the defen-
dant actually did., 220 The founder of the Forensic Panel, Michael Weiner,
M.D., feels it is necessary for jurors and judges, when deciding whether the
aggravating circumstance of heinousness or depravity is present, be provided
with an objective tool to make these decisions, so they are not influenced on
trial tactics and possible bias.22' This is because "[sitandardizing the already
used terminology of 'heinous,' 'depraved,' and 'evil,' is a matter of fairness
and justice." 2
218. Id.
219. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 428 (1980)).
220. Weiner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 417.
221. Weiner, FAQ, supra note 176.
222. Weiner, Response to Simon, supra note 82, at 418.
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